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Is generalized debt relief an effective development 
strategy, or should assistance be tailored to countries’ 
characteristics? To answer this question, the authors 
build a simple model in which recipient governments 
reveal their creditworthiness if donors offer them to 
choose between aid and debt relief. Since offering such 
a menu is costly, it is preferred by donors only when 
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A main criticism of debt relief initiatives is that developing countries￿poor investment performance
may re￿ ect governments￿preferences rather than debt overhang problems (Easterly, 2002). Were
this the case, the impact of debt relief initiatives on long-term growth would be limited. Indeed,
if high levels of indebtedness mainly re￿ ect countries￿discount factors, then debt forgiveness will
just create the conditions for the accumulation of new unsustainable debt, and history will repeat.
While we cannot rule out this possibility, it is di¢ cult to believe that no highly indebted government
cares about long term growth, and would not invest in worthy projects were its debt cancelled.
In our view, the real problem with debt relief is that, while it helps making a country cred-
itworthy, by itself it is not enough. A creditworthy borrower is one which has little debt and is
believed to be willing to repay it (good reputation). Unfortunately, generalized debt relief, as it
has been conceived, reduces the stock of debt but may not help countries building their own credit
history. However, this does not mean that it would not be possible to design alternative debt relief
policies so that (private) lenders could distinguish the potentially good borrowers from the ￿serial
defaulters.￿Were this possible, what would be the costs of such policies when compared to policies
of generalized debt relief?
In order to answer this important question, in this paper we develop a simple model in which
donors do not know debtor governments￿discount factors (and thus their willingness to invest) but
are allowed to use a menu of o¢ cial assistance instruments (aid or debt relief) as a screening device.
The idea we explore is that low-discount governments value debt relief more than high-discount
ones. This means that if they are asked to choose between aid or debt relief, they will choose
debt relief (while high-discount ones will prefer aid if the latter is large enough) and the choice
will convey precious information about their time preferences, and thus create the conditions for
greater market access. On the contrary, a policy that provides debt relief to all countries leads
to an ine¢ cient allocation of credit. The reason is that if private lenders cannot distinguish good
borrowers from serial defaulters, the amount of loans that the former obtain is lower, and the
interest rate higher than if their characteristics were disclosed.
The main message of this paper is that the design of o¢ cial assistance is important and that
the optimal assistance policy depends both upon recipients characteristics and donors￿generosity.
In particular, we show that the more generous donors and the more patient recipient governments
are, the higher are the returns of aid-or-debt relief policies that allow creditworthy governments to
signal their type.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the literature on debt relief. Section
3 presents stylized facts on capital market access by countries that received MDRI relief. Our
asymmetric information model of development assistance and private lending is introduced in Sec-
tion 4 and is used in Section 5 to examine the e⁄ects of three alternative development policies:
generalized full debt relief; the o⁄er between aid or debt relief; and a policy of only aid. Section
6 studies the welfare properties of these three policies. Section 7 discusses partial versus full debt
relief. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The existing literature highlights two main channels through which debt relief may a⁄ect investment
and growth. The ￿rst is the resource channel: debt relief reduces debt service payments and this
1automatically increases investment opportunities in resource constrained countries (Cohen 1993).
The second is the debt overhang channel: debt relief increases the bene￿ts that debtors countries
may reap in investing and/or undertaking reform, and thus increase the incentives to pursue such
policies (Krugman 1988, Sachs 1989).
Regarding the ￿rst channel, the empirical ￿ndings are mixed. On the one hand, Bird and Milne
(2003) question the resource constrained assumption arguing that Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs) serviced their debt out of the loans and grants provided by o¢ cial donors. On the other
hand, although debt service payments are usually not signi￿cant in debt-growth equations (Patilllo
et al. 2004), there is some evidence suggesting that debt service payments crowd out investment
(Chowdhury, 2004; and Hansen, 2004). Interestingly, Presbitero (2006) ￿nds that the impact of
debt service on investment is stronger than the e⁄ect of foreign aid.
Regarding the second channel, the support is much stronger even if results depend very much
on the empirical speci￿cation, and further work is needed to fully understand the transmission
mechanism (Rajan 2005). Existing evidence suggests that debt reduces growth when the debt-
to-GDP ratio lies between a ￿debt overhang￿(Pattillo et al., 2002, 2004) and ￿debt irrelevance￿
threshold (Cordella et al., 2010). However, these thresholds and even the negative debt-growth
relation could hinge on country-speci￿c factors, such as the quality of policies and institutions
(Imbs and Ranciere 2005); and countries with better policies exhibit higher debt overhang and
debt irrelevance thresholds than countries that perform less well and for which the negative debt-
growth relation is weaker (Cordella et al., 2010).
Very few studies investigate the direct e⁄ects of debt relief.1 Among these Depetris-Chauvin and
Kraay (2005), Presbitero (2009), and Johansson (2010) ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect of debt forgiveness
on investment and growth in HIPCs; Cassimon and Van Campenhout (2007) show instead that
debt relief is more e⁄ective than aid in promoting public investment in the long run, at least in the
sample of HIPCs that have reached the ￿decision point.￿
A potential advantage of debt relief vis-￿-vis other forms of assistance is to create access to
private capital markets. According to Diwan and Rodrik (1992), new lenders may be deterred
from investing in highly indebted countries if they expect to be ￿taxed￿by old creditors. If this
is the case, pro￿table investment opportunities may be forgone for lack of capital in￿ ows, and a
debt reduction by old private creditors may be needed to convince new and more e¢ cient lenders
to step in. Indeed, Arslanalp and Henry (2005) show that Brady deals succeeded in stimulating
investment and growth principally because of the new ￿ ow of foreign lending to the private sector.
Looking at the private sector response, Raddatz (2011) estimates how the stock prices of South
African multinational ￿rms reacted to the announcement of debt relief in countries in which they
had subsidiaries, and ￿nds a positive e⁄ect which is consistent with the debt overhang story.
HIPC￿ s ability to access private credit may depend, however, on the quality of their policies and
institutions. Arslanalp and Henry (2006) contend that the impact of debt relief on HIPCs is limited
because such countries generally lack those basic economic infrastructures and institutions that are
needed to attract private foreign capital. Asiedu (2003) presents a model where only countries
with a su¢ ciently high discount factor, that one can interpret as high levels of institutional quality,
can commit to repay and thus attract foreign investment. By increasing the country￿ s repayment
capacity, debt relief lowers the threshold level of the discount factor needed to access world capital
markets but probably not enough for HIPCs to obtain external ￿nancing.
1This may re￿ ect the di¢ culty in properly measuring debt forgiveness.
2Some critics of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) claim, instead, that the problem
is not too little but too much lending, and that debt forgiveness will allow HIPCs to start (again)
borrowing excessively using ￿scal space to ￿nance consumption. According to Easterly (2002),
to the extent that high debts and repayment di¢ culties are a sign of high discount rates, debt
relief is likely to be granted to exactly those countries that are less willing to invest. Bauer (1991)
suggests that debt relief creates moral hazard in that it encourages countries to take on new loans
because of the expectation of further relief. Easy access to external ￿nancing is also viewed as
undermining debt sustainability. Radelet (2005) warns that debt relief could restart a vicious lend-
and-forgive cycle. O¢ cial donors have also expressed concerns about the risk of ￿overborrowing￿
at non-concessional terms in the aftermath of debt relief and warned against the possibility that
￿ free riding￿on debt relief and aid by non-concessional lenders might undo years of international
e⁄orts to restore debt sustainability (World Bank 2006, IDA and IMF 2006).
Worries about imprudent borrowing/lending may appear contradictory in light of what Bulow
(2000) considers the main test for successful debt relief: whether it restores positive net resource
transfers to countries where international lending is pro￿table. Absent this motivation, one may
even wonder why debt relief was preferred to conventional aid.2 Michaelowa (2003) and Bird
and Milne (2003) suggest that debt relief is the cheapest way to obtain public credit and may be
granted to conceal imprudent past lending. However, Reisen and Sokhna (2008) ￿nd little evidence
of ￿imprudent lending￿to debt-relief bene￿ciaries up to 2006.
Finally, this paper is related to the recent theoretical contributions on aid e⁄ectiveness when
donors and recipients￿objectives di⁄er.3 By focusing on incentives, this literature underscores that
the way aid is disbursed does matter, and donors should tailor their assistance according to the
recipient country￿ s characteristics. In this respect, the aid versus debt relief analysis of this paper
complements Cordella and Dell￿ Ariccia (2007), who focus on the trade-o⁄ between budget support
and project aid in fostering development and growth, and Cordella and Ulku (2007) who instead
look at the grant versus loans trade-o⁄.
3 Debt Relief and Capital Market Access
Notwithstanding the pessimistic predictions and concerns of many debt relief critics, low-income
countries are now experiencing a renewed access to international capital markets: private capital
in￿ ows to Sub-Saharan African countries rose sharply, from very low levels in 2002 up to 84 billion
dollars in 2007, with loans accounting for a third of the total (Delechat et al. 2010). While
such ￿gures mainly re￿ ect FDI and equity in￿ ows in the mineral, banking, and telecommunication
sectors ￿ and cover non-HIPC as well as HIPC countries￿ some HIPCs have already re-started
borrowing from commercial banks at non-concessional terms and issued bonds on international
capital markets.
On the bright side, Ghana became the ￿rst African HIPC to issue a 10-year $750 million
Eurobond, in September 2007. Senegal also successfully launched a 5-year $200 million Eurobond
in December 2009, and Congo restructured London Club commercial debt in November 2007 with
the launch of a 30-year $478 million nonrated global bond (Domeland and Kharas 2009). In the
2One additional motivation, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is that debt relief, by clearing arrears, allows
to normalize the relation between donors and countries in default.
3See, among others, Murshed and Sen (1995), Svensson (2000), Cordella and Dell￿ Ariccia (2002), and Azam and
La⁄ont (2003).
3meantime, Tanzania (which took a $400 million loan from China in August 2009) and Zambia are
seeking a credit rate in order to issue $500 million Eurobonds later this year, after they had to
postpone their plans in 2008 (together with Angola, Kenya and Uganda) because of the global
￿nancial crisis. At the same time, several HIPCs, which developed local-currency bond markets,
have succeeded in selling treasury bills in their own currency to foreign investors. In 2008 the share
of domestic debt held by foreign investors was 13% in Zambia, about 11% in Ghana, estimated at
more than $400 million, and likewise signi￿cant in Tanzania and Uganda (Delechat et al. 2010,
Domeland and Kharas 2009).
On the less bright side, C￿te d￿ Ivoire, a HIPC that has not yet reached completion point, after
exchanging defaulted Brady bonds with a 22-year Eurobond worth $2300 million in April 2010,
defaulted on the same bond in February 2011. Further insights into the ability of post-MDRI
countries to access international ￿nancial markets can be gained from data on public and private
borrowing from private creditors taken from the Global Development Finance (GDF) database of
the World Bank.
Figure 1a reports the unweighted average of the ratios of yearly disbursements on long-term
loans and bonds to GDP for two groups of IDA-only countries: the 21 HIPCs that received MDR
in 2006 (post-MDRI countries);4 and a control group of 15 countries that includes the remaining
non-HIPC IDA-only countries but excludes resource rich Angola and Nigeria. The yearly amount
of long-term borrowing by post-MDRI countries increased sharply from less than 0.3% of GDP in
2006 to more than 1% in 2007 to stabilize thereafter around 0.9% of GDP in the wake of the global
￿nancial crisis.
This performance is partly due to the low level of private in￿ ows in the period up to 2006
when HIPC countries, being under IMF-supported programs, had to abide by stringent limits on
non-concessional borrowing. However, Figure 1a shows that the increase in long-term borrowing
from private lenders in relief-recipient countries was not much faster than in other non-HIPC IDA
countries. Despite the latter group has an unweighted average debt-to-GDP ratio of 51%, higher
than the 32% ratio of post-MDRI countries, in 2007 it also experienced a sustained increase in new
borrowing; from 1.2 to 1.9% of GDP.
￿ Insert Figure 1a￿
Further evidence on private foreign lending to low-income countries can be obtained from data on
the amount of international claims of the commercial banks of the 30 industrial countries reporting
to the Bank of International Settlement (BIS). Although BIS data exclude loans from emerging
lenders, they cover short-term loans that are not reported in the GDF statistics of the World
Bank. Figure 1b shows banks￿total ￿nancial claims in foreign currencies, on the same groups of
countries considered above, on a consolidated basis,5 and tells a similar story: while, after the full
implementation of MDRI relief in 2006, foreign claims (relative to GDP) on post-MDRI countries
have increased faster than in non-HIPC IDA-only countries, since then the two groups behaved
quite similarly.
4The MDRI group also includes Bolivia which is an IDA-blend country.
5That is, net of accounts between head o¢ ces and their branches and subsidiaries.
4￿ Insert Figure 1b￿
Although debt relief has brought the debt of HIPCs to sustainable levels and allowed these
countries to gain access to external ￿nancing, the evidence suggests that such countries remain
somehow credit constrained (for instance vis-￿-vis other IDA countries that, despite their higher
debt ratios, could build a track record of creditworthiness). Furthermore, the new borrowing from
private creditors to HIPC has come at high interest rates. The default risk premium that post-
MDRI countries have to pay on new debt can be measured by the spreads between the yields on
the dollar bonds issued by Ghana and Senegal and the yield on US Treasuries of the same maturity.
Figure 2a shows that the yield spread on the Ghana bond has remained above 4% while the spread
on the Senegal bond has been even higher at 6.5%.
￿ Insert Figure 2a￿
Further evidence of the relative high interest rates at which post-MDRIs borrow comes from the
GDF database. Figure 2b shows the simple mean for post-MDRI countries of the average interest
rates that they pay on new public and publicly guaranteed debt from private creditors and from
o¢ cial creditors.6 While interest rates on concessional o¢ cial lending has remained below 2% over
the whole period, interest rates on private lending has ￿ uctuated around 4% reaching 6% in 2007
when new borrowing became available after the implementation of MDRI relief.7 More importantly,
there is no evidence that debt relief initiatives have brought about a reduction in the interest rate
on new private debt despite the fall in debt levels.
￿ Insert Figure 2b￿
This brings us to the critical question of our paper: Would it have been possible to design the
debt relief initiative so that markets could distinguish between good borrowers and bad ones and
doing so would facilitate capital market access to the former (but not to the latter)? In order to
shed some light on such an important question, and provide some thoughts on how to design future
debt relief initiatives, in the remaining of the paper we sketch a simple model that could help us to
better understand the incentive problems associated with debt relief versus other more traditional
forms of assistance.
4 An Asymmetric Information Model of Debt Relief, Aid and
Private Lending
In this paper, we extend Sachs (1988) classical debt overhang model introducing uncertainty about
(debtor) governments￿time preferences and thus their willingness to invest. More precisely, we
6Country data on interest rates are weighted averages of the interest rates on new debt commitments taken from
the GDF database.
7Evidence of higher borrowing costs would emerge from excluding bank credit covered by guarantees of export-
credit agencies.
5assume that a government￿ s discount factor is dj, where superscript j can either be ￿low￿(j = l)
when the government is ￿impatient,￿or ￿high￿(j = h) when instead it is ￿patient,￿and discounts
the future less. We thus have that dl < dh < 1. We also assume that o¢ cial lenders/donors
do not know the discount factor of any particular government but they do know the probability
distribution of types and correctly assign a probability ￿ 2 (0;1) that the government is patient.
We assume that there are two periods, t = 0;1. In each period, the government has an en-
dowment equal to w. At the beginning of period t = 0, the government has an outstanding debt
equal to D to be serviced in period t = 1. In period t = 0, the government may also receive grants,
A, from o¢ cial donors and/or new credit, L, from private lenders and must decide how much to
consume and how much to invest for consumption in the next period.8
The government utility function is given by:
Uj =
￿
c0 + djc1 if c0 ￿ w;
￿z otherwise;
(1)
where z > 0 is an arbitrarily large constant that captures the idea that c0 = w is the subsistence
level of consumption. Alternatively, we could assume that the endowment w cannot be invested.
First period consumption is equal to
c0 = w + A + L ￿ I; (2)
where A is the amount of aid (in the form of grants) from o¢ cial donors, L is the amount of new
loans from private lenders, and I denotes investment. Since in period t = 0 consumption cannot
be lower than the endowment (c0 ￿ w), investment should necessarily be ￿nanced out of external
resources, A or L.
We also assume that the absorptive capacity of a developing economy is limited in that there
is an upper bound to the number of projects that can be implemented.9 Denoting with K the
maximum amount of productive investment, the return on investment is equal to
R(I) = ￿minfI;Kg; (3)
where ￿ is the gross return on the investment that does not exceed K. It is worth noting that
investment yields the same return independently on whether it is ￿nanced through new loans or
aid, that is, aid is fully fungible.
In period t = 1; the government decides whether to default or repay the (old and new) debt. If
the government decides to default on its obligations, the country loses a share ￿ < 1 of its current
output X, a loss that it is only partially appropriated by debtholders. Indeed, we assume that
creditors can appropriate a share 0 < ￿ < 1 of the output loss of a country, ￿X.10 We refer to ￿ as
the recovery rate.
8We further assume that aid cannot be invested at the international risk free rate. This is quite a realistic
assumption in the case of HIPC as resources invested abroad could be con￿scated to repay previous obligations. In
addition, the donor community can make pressures for aid to be spent rather than saved.
9Alternatively, we could assume decreasing returns from investment.
10Notice that when ￿ ! 0 our formulation converges to the trade sanction story, and when ￿ ! 1 to the case
of complete renegotiation in which the indebted country can fully renegotiate its debt to avoid sanction. The
intermediate cases could encompass alternative arrangements between creditors and debtors that are beyond the
scope of this paper.
6Hence, if the government repays its obligations, second period consumption is equal to
c1 = w + ￿minfI;Kg ￿ rL ￿ D; (4)
where r is the gross interest rate on new loans o⁄ered at time t = 0. Finally, we assume that the
lending market is competitive, that private lenders are risk neutral, and that the risk-free (gross)
interest rate is equal to i, so that r ￿ i > 1:
If the country defaults on debt, its second period consumption is equal to
c1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[w + ￿minfI;Kg]: (5)
In order to simplify the analysis and focus on economic interesting cases we make the following
assumptions:
￿w < D; (A.1)
￿￿ < i < ￿; (A.2)
dl￿ < 1; (A.3)
dh minfi;(1 ￿ ￿)￿g > 1; (A.4)
D > iK: (A.5)
Let brie￿ y discuss what such assumptions imply. Assumption (A.1) implies that, absent any
form of aid or debt relief, the developing country will default on its debt as the cost of servicing the
debt, D, is higher than the cost of default, ￿w. Assumption (A.2) implies that investment increases
default costs by less than it increases debt, which imposes an upper bound to the amount of credit
that a country might receive. The crucial assumptions characterizing the time preferences of the two
governments, and thus their consumption-investment decisions, are (A.3) and (A.4). Assumption
(A.3) states that for an impatient government the utility of a unit of current consumption is
greater than the utility (in present value terms) that it would obtain by investing the same unit
in production. This implies that it would consume all resources it receives in the current period.
Assumption (A.4) instead implies that for a patient government the utility of consumption in
period 1 discounted either at the risk-free rate or by the cost of default is higher than the utility of
consumption in period 0.
These assumptions capture the idea that governments facing the same pro￿table investment
opportunities behave quite di⁄erently depending on their time preferences. Governments with
short horizons (impatient); they would rather consume the funds received by the donor community
or by private lenders as in Easterly (2002). On the contrary, patient governments would invest such
funds in pro￿table projects. These are also the governments which would mostly bene￿t from a
￿fresh start￿provided by debt relief as in Sachs (2002). It would certainly be desirable to distinguish
the type of government so that only patient governments may have access to international capital
markets. Finally, assumption (A.5) guarantees that the absorptive capacity is limited and, thus,
that (after debt relief) the new loans used to ￿nance productive investment do not exceed the old
debt and thus can be ￿sustainable.￿
4.1 The consumption-investment decision
We start this section by examining the di⁄erent consumption-investment choices of patient and
impatient governments as well as their default decisions in a benchmark case in which no form of
aid or debt relief is anticipated. In this case, it follows directly from our assumptions that:
7Lemma 1 (i) An impatient government consumes in period t = 0 all the resources (aid or loans)
that it receives. A patient government, instead, invests all the resources it receives up to amount
K in which the absorptive capacity of the economy is reached. (ii) In absence of aid or debt relief,
both types of government default on their debt obligations and, as a consequence, are not able to
borrow. (iii) The maximum amount of loans that a government may obtain is L = K ￿ A.
Proof: In Appendix
Hence, in our very simple set up, while an impatient government would never invest the funds
provided by the donor community or obtained from the capital market, a patient government always
invests these resources.11 However, since the absorptive capacity of the economy is limited, the
amount of funds that a patient government invests does not exceed K. In addition, in the absence
of aid or debt relief, both types of government would default on their past debt obligations and thus
they would not receive any new credit by private lenders. Starting from such a situation, in what
follows we analyze how aid or debt relief policies a⁄ect the consumption-investment and default
decisions of patient and impatient governments.
5 Development Assistance
5.1 A policy of generalized debt relief
In this section, we show that a policy that provides debt relief to all countries allows both types
of government to access international capital markets. In addition, as the governments￿time pref-
erences are not revealed, the amount of new credit that the two types obtain is the same and, in
general, the interest rate at which they can borrow is higher than the risk-free interest rate because
the impatient government will default on the new loans. This implies that patient governments
invest and repay the loans but obtain lower funds and at worse conditions than under full infor-
mation. To simplify the analysis, in what follows, we only consider the case in which the debt is





If this were not the case, then both types of government would always repay the new loan
and the patient government would always obtain the desired amount of resources L = K (at the
risk-free interest rate). Ruling this trivial case out, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 If the probability that a government is patient is low (￿ ￿ ￿), complete debt relief
will give countries a limited level of market access at the risk-free rate; if instead the probability is
su¢ ciently high (￿ > ￿), debt relief will provide greater market access but at a higher interest rate,
as impatient governments will ￿nd it optimal to default.
Proof: In Appendix
11This result depends on the assumption that d
h(1￿￿)￿ > 1. If such an assumption does not hold, then a patient
government that defaults in period t = 1 consumes all the resources it receives in period t = 0. This would complicate
the analysis but would not a⁄ect our qualitative results.
8Referring the reader to the appendix for the exact values of ￿ and for a complete analysis, we
present our main ￿ndings in an intuitive way with the auxilium of Figure 3 and Figure 4 where
we plot loan volumes and interest rates as a function of the probability ￿ that the government is
patient (for arbitrary values of the parameters),12distinguishing between the case of relatively high
and low absorptive capacity.
￿Insert Figures 3 and 4 ￿
In the former case (K >
￿w
i(1￿￿)), Figure 3 describes the main forces at stake. If the probability
that the government is patient is low (￿ < ￿1), then the only equilibrium is one in which credit is
cheap (everybody is charged the risk-free rate) but rationed. The reason is that the pool of borrowers
is so bad, that any expansion of credit above the level in which an impatient government is willing
to repay would be too expensive to be attractive for a patient government. This ceases to be the
case when the quality of the pool of borrowers improves. Namely, for ￿ ￿ ￿1, a patient government
becomes interested in borrowing at the current rates (e r =
ie L￿(1￿￿)￿￿w
￿e L ) but quantities (e L =
￿w
r￿￿￿)
remain rationed because of the binding default constraint (of the patient government). When the
quality of the pool of borrowers further improves, then the patient government￿ s default is no more
an issue, and sovereigns can borrow up to K being charged an interest rate (e rk =
iK￿(1￿￿)￿￿w
￿K )
that converges to the risk free rate when ￿ goes to one.
Figure 4 deals with the case in which the country￿ s absorptive capacity is relatively low (K <
￿w
i(1￿￿)) and thus the demand for credit by a patient government is limited. In this case the no-
default constraint does not bind and, as soon as the latter ￿nds it interesting to borrow (￿ ￿ ￿2),
at the risk adjusted interest rate (e rk), it can borrow as much as it needs (K).
Summing up our ￿ndings, if the probability that a government is patient is low (￿ ￿ ￿), the
credit constraint it faces is particularly severe. If this is the case, the interest rate required by
private lenders deters patient governments from borrowing more than the amount that impatient
governments obtain under full information.
However, patient governments can be credit constrained even in the case in which the distrib-
ution of types is not so skewed. In this case (￿ > ￿), patient governments still may not be able to
borrow the amount that they would obtain under full information and do pay a higher interest rate.
It is also worth noting that the market provides impatient governments with an amount of funds
greater than under full information and this is a main source of distortion. Finally, as expected,
the more the borrower can recover in the case of default (the higher ￿) the greater the market
access for the developing country.
5.2 O⁄ering the choice between aid and debt relief
Patient governments value debt relief more than impatient ones as debt relief allows them to access
international capital markets and thus obtain the resources they need to fund investment projects.13
Thus, the choice between aid and debt relief may convey information about the time preferences of
12In particular, we assume that ￿ = :3, w = :2; i = 1:1, ￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:5; K = :1, and K = :07 respectively, in
Figure 3, and Figure 4.
13We continue to focus on the interesting case that ￿w < iK. If this were not so, both governments would choose
debt relief.
9a debtor government and thus help channel private funds to the governments that want to invest.
This opens up the possibility for the donor community to screen out debtors by o⁄ering the choice
between full debt relief and aid.
In what follows, we show that a scheme that o⁄ers the choice between aid and debt relief
can help screening patient from impatient governments. In particular, we prove the existence of
a separating equilibrium where debt relief is chosen by the patient government, and aid by the
impatient government. As the choice of debt relief identi￿es a government of type j = h, such a
choice allows a patient government to borrow from the capital market the same amount of new
funds, b L ￿ minf
￿w
i￿￿￿;Kg, that it would obtain under full information. As standard in screening
models, the amount of aid that must be o⁄ered to an impatient government to choose this option
and reveal its type cannot be lower than b L.
Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 If the country absorptive capacity is limited (K <
￿w
i￿￿￿) and donors o⁄er govern-
ments the choice between debt relief and aid (in an amount equivalent to the borrowing capacity of
a patient government, that is b A = K), the impatient government chooses aid, and the patient one
debt relief.
Proof: In Appendix
Corollary 1 In the situation above, if donors o⁄er only aid, both types of government default on
their debt, and for all levels of aid A ￿ K the utility of a patient government is lower than in the
case donors o⁄er the choice between aid and debt relief.
Proof: In Appendix
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is the following. As long as the (unconstrained) demand
for investment funding by a patient government is limited, the latter would prefer debt relief to a
comparable amount of aid since debt relief allows it to avoid default and to retain the pro￿ts of its
investment. Indeed, debt relief allows a patient government to repay the new loans and o⁄ers it the
opportunity to build a good creditor reputation. As standard in adverse selection models, in order
to screen patient and impatient governments, the impatient ones should somehow be ￿bribed,￿in
this case through generous amounts of aid.
Corollary 2 clari￿es that a policy of only aid cannot replicate the allocation of resources of
a policy that o⁄ers the choice between aid and debt relief, even if A = K, because a patient
government defaults on its debt. It follows directly from the previous proposition that a patient
government strictly prefers debt relief to aid and thus that its utility with a policy of only aid is
lower than its utility with a policy of aid or debt relief, while the utility of an impatient government
is the same.
6 Optimal Assistance Policy
Having discussed how three alternative strategies to promote development ￿ only debt relief, aid
or debt relief, only aid￿ may a⁄ect countries￿incentives, in this section we look at the optimal
assistance policy from the point of view of donors. Obviously, the policy is optimal in relation
10to o¢ cial donors￿speci￿c objective functions. Moreover, as di⁄erent policies have di⁄erent costs
in term of resources transferred to debtor countries, the donors￿optimal choice depends on the
resources available to them.
We assume that donors maximize developing countries long term consumption, that is, the
di⁄erence between second-period consumption with and without intervention. Such an objective is
in line with the view that the purpose of o¢ cial assistance is to create opportunities for development
and not to foster current consumption that often creates political patronage that ends up keeping
the country stuck in a low-growth equilibrium.
Donors￿maximization also depends upon the cost (C) of the policy. Assuming, without great
loss of generality, that C is quadratic in the amount of resources, B, devoted to development
assistance, we have that
MaxV =
￿ch







In what follows, we focus on the interesting case where the policy that o⁄ers the choice between
aid and debt relief allows to separate the two types of government, that is, on the case in which
K <
￿w
i￿￿￿, and b L = K. We also assume that the present value of debt relief is equal to the market
value of the old debt in the absence of debt relief discounted to period t = 0 (for donors we use
the risk-free rate as the discount factor). Since, by Lemma 1 part (ii), both types of government
default in the absence of assistance, then the present market value of D is equal to
￿￿w
i , that is, to
the present value of the resources that creditors can appropriate in case of default.
The three policies, where subscripts AR, R, and A stand respectively for aid-or-debt-relief, only
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(9)
Interestingly, (9) shows that the aid provided to patient governments is cheaper than the one
provided to impatient governments. This is because aid is invested (up to K, see Lemma 1), and
it increases the amount of resources that can be appropriated by donors in the case of default on
the old debt, D. It is also worth noting that the maximum amount of aid that donors would ever
provide is equal to K because any amount of aid in excess of K would not be invested, while it
would increase the cost of assistance.
From a simple inspection of equations (7)-(9) it is easy to ascertain that the cost of an aid-or-
debt-relief policy, CAR, is greater than the cost of a policy of only debt relief, CR,14 while the cost
of a policy of only aid, CA, necessarily depends on the total amount of aid A ￿ K, and decreases
with the recovery rate ￿.
Donors￿objective function in the case of only debt relief, is given by15
14This follows directly from (A:6).
15Note that, if K <
￿w
i￿￿￿, then b ￿ < 1.
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where the di⁄erent cases map the di⁄erent segments depicted in Figure 3 and 4. For the cases of
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; (12)
where A￿ = minfargmax
A
VA;Kg.
Our main ￿ndings are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) If the probability that the recipient government is patient, ￿, is high and the
cost of assistance, ￿, is low, then a policy of aid-or-debt-relief is optimal; (ii) for a lower probability
that the government is patient and a higher cost of assistance, donors prefer a policy of only debt
relief; (iii) (very limited) aid is the preferred policy only for a high cost of assistance, and/or a low
probability that the government is patient.
Proof: In Appendix
Let now try to get a better understanding of the Proposition with the help of Figure 5 and 6
where we plot donors￿objective function under the three regimes for di⁄erent values of the cost of
assistance (low ￿ = 1, medium ￿ = 10, and high ￿ = 100) both in the case of relatively high and
low absorptive capacity (Figure 5 and 6, respectively).16
￿Insert Figure 5 and 6 ￿
To start with, remember that the second-period increase in a patient government consumption
with an aid-or-debt-relief policy is, trivially, higher than with a policy only-debt relief, and higher
than with a policy of only aid because of Corollary 1. Notice further, that the expected utility
associated with an aid-or-debt-relief policy increases while its expected cost decreases with ￿ .
This means that if the probability, ￿, that the government is patient is su¢ ciently high, and the
cost of assistance, ￿, is low, o⁄ering the choice between aid or debt relief is necessarily the best
policy. Indeed, since an aid-or-debt-relief policy is the most e¢ cient but costliest way of providing
assistance, it is more likely to be the preferred one when donors are generous (￿ = 1) and the pool
16We use the same parametrization as in Figure 3 and 4.
12of good borrowers is large. When instead such pool is small, aid-or-debt relief becomes less and
less an interesting option, and is dominated by debt relief for intermediate values of ￿, or by aid
for very low values of ￿. Of course, the threshold values for the di⁄erent cases depend on the cost
of aid, ￿. The higher is such cost, the more appealing is the aid policy (which becomes increasingly
less generous when ￿ becomes small) and less so the aid-or-debt-relief policy.
Indeed, when the cost of assistance is very high (￿ = 100), no matter how good is the pool of
borrowers, an aid-or-debt-relief policy (that we know to be the costliest) is dominated by the other
two policies. Actually, when ￿ tends to in￿nity, the cost of a policy of only aid can be driven to
zero by reducing aid to zero, while both debt relief and aid-or-debt-relief entail a positive cost. This
means that if the probability that the government is patient is low, cost considerations prevail, and
very little aid is necessarily the best policy, while if such probability is high enough, debt relief is
donors￿preferred option. This is clearly depicted in Panel c where aid is the optimal choice for low
values of ￿, while debt relief is optimal for higher values of ￿, that is when donors want to provide
market access but the cost of separating is too high.
Finally, for intermediate costs of assistance (￿ = 10), the optimal policy depends on the prob-
ability that the government is patient. As it is clearly shown in Panel b, if this probability is low,
aid is again preferred by donors, while a policy of only debt relief is optimal for intermediate values
of ￿, where donors want to provide market access but the cost of separating is too high. A policy
of aid-or-debt relief prevails only for high values of ￿, when the pool of good borrowers is large
enough to make the expected returns from this policy su¢ ciently high and its cost su¢ ciently low.
7 Partial versus Full Debt Relief
In our discussion of optimal development assistance, we have sidestepped one important issue: that
of partial versus full debt relief, implicitly assuming that granting as much relief as possible would
be optimal for donors. However, if resources for developmental assistance are costly, partial debt
relief becomes a policy option to consider.
We have explored this case and found that (partial) debt relief must be substantial for an aid-or-
partial-debt-relief o⁄er to be able to separate the two types of governments. In particular, the debt
write o⁄ should not only make the remaining debt sustainable in the absence of new private loans,
but also be large enough to make a patient government willing to repay both the new and the old
unforgiven debt. When this is the case, and the probability of a patient government is su¢ ciently
high, a policy of generalized full relief can be compared to a policy of aid-or-partial-relief of the same
or even lower cost. It turns out that if the two policies have the same cost, they also yield the same
utility, while a less costly aid-or-partial-relief contract yields a lower second period consumption.
This implies that the trade o⁄between the higher consumption and the greater cost of a separating
o⁄er cannot be escaped by granting only partial debt relief. The reason is that the savings from
partial relief come at the cost of redistributing resources away from patient governments, which
o⁄sets the e¢ ciency gains of the separating contract.
Finally, suppose that the cost of implementing a separating aid-or-partial relief policy is too high.
Although the amount of debt relief falls below the minimum needed for separation, a generalized
partial-relief policy could still be viable. This can be the case if the absorptive capacity is relatively
high, and thus separation too costly; and, more importantly, if debt relief is large enough to make
the remaining debt sustainable. Then, the issue is whether generalized partial relief can do better
than aid. Noting that the cost of partial debt relief can be driven to zero when the unsustainable
13portion of the debt is written o⁄, a policy of generalized partial relief can be compared to a policy
of only aid with the same cost. Interestingly, it turns out that with a policy of generalized partial
relief the patient government is always rationed, but its second period consumption is nevertheless
greater than with a policy of only aid of the same cost. Hence, when a separating aid-or-debt-relief
contract cannot be o⁄ered, o¢ cial donors should always prefer a policy of generalized partial relief
to a policy of only aid.
To conclude, our discussion of partial relief suggests that optimal assistance policy should be
restricted to the choice between an aid-or-debt relief policy and a policy of generalized debt-relief;
which one is best depends on the trade o⁄ between current costs and future consumption.
8 Conclusion
The idea that debt relief is an e⁄ective strategy in helping developing countries reaching the MDGs
has been very popular among policymakers in the last decade. However, among economists, doubts
remained about whether debt relief is necessarily the most e¢ cient way of providing developmental
assistance to poor (and indebted) countries.
If donors consider aid and debt relief to a large extent as substitutes, debt relief may not increase
the net ￿ ow of resources to HIPCs. If this were the case, the key question is not whether debt relief
is good for growth (or poverty reduction) but whether it is better than other forms of assistance. As
it is well known in the literature, in the realm of developmental policies there are no one-size-￿ts-all
solutions and the relative e⁄ectiveness of di⁄erent policies depends on countries￿characteristics.
There are no doubts in our mind that in presence of a debt overhang, debt relief is a very
powerful way of providing assistance. However, this does not mean that providing debt relief to all
indebted countries is the most e⁄ective way to create market access to countries that deserve it. In
some countries, high indebtedness could re￿ ect a high discount factor. In this case, debt forgiveness
would just create the condition for the accumulation of new (unsustainable) debt. Other countries,
instead, could be willing to invest in long-term developmental project but cannot because of their
debt overhang. This brings us to the main question of this paper: Is it possible to use assistance
policies to ￿separate￿creditworthy from non-creditworthy countries?
Our answer is yes, but it can be costly. The reason is that to allow creditworthy countries to
build their good borrowers￿reputation, one needs to compensate ￿impatient￿ governments with
large amounts of aid. The cost of such compensation depends on how good the pool of countries is.
This means that we should expect an aid-or-debt-relief policy in place when donors are willing to
commit a substantial amount of resources to developmental assistance and/or developing countries
are likely to invest in long term projects.
When donors have little resource to fund developmental assistance, then the donors￿choice is
between limited aid or debt relief. The problem with either choice is that it makes it di¢ cult and
costly to potentially creditworthy countries to build a credit history. This means that they can
remain severely credit rationed for a while. If this were the case, a generalized debt relief policy
would self-defeat the very rationale of debt relief: to allow market access to countries that deserve
it!
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17Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Let ￿rst consider the case of a government of type j = l: If it does not default, its utility can be
written as:
Ul
ND = w + A + L ￿ I + dl[w + ￿minfI;Kg ￿ rL ￿ D] (13)
subject to A + L ￿ I ￿ 0. Since
@Ul
ND
@I ￿ ￿1 + ￿dl (with the equality sign for I ￿ K), it follows
from assumption (A.3) that
@Ul
ND
@I < 0: Assume now that it defaults. Its utility can be written as:
Ul
D = w + A + L ￿ I + dl(1 ￿ ￿)[w + ￿minfI;Kg] (14)
subject to A+L￿I ￿ 0. Again, assumption (A.3) guarantees that
@Ul
D
@I < 0 and that no investment
occurs.
Consider now a government of type j = h. If it does not default, its utility can be written as:
Uh
ND = w + A + L ￿ I + dh[w + ￿minfI;Kg ￿ rL ￿ D]; (15)
while if it defaults as:
Uh
D = w + A + L ￿ I + dh(1 ￿ ￿)[w + ￿minfI;Kg]: (16)
subject to A + L ￿ I ￿ 0.
Assumption (A.4) now insures that both in the case of default and not default @Uh=@I ￿ 0
if and only if I ￿ K. Hence, if L > K ￿ A a patient government invests I = K and consumes
A + L ￿ K in period t = 0, while if L ￿ K ￿ A the government invests all the external resources
A + L that it receives in period t = 0. Q.E.D.
(ii) Consider ￿rst a government of type j = l. From part (i), this government consumes all the
resources it receives in period t = 0. Hence, it will default if (1 ￿ ￿)w > w ￿ rL ￿ D, or
￿w < D + rL (17)
which is always veri￿ed because of assumption (A.1).
Consider, now, a government of type j = h. From part (i), if L ￿ K ￿ A, this government
invests all the resources it receives in period t = 0. In the absence of debt relief, it will default if
(1 ￿ ￿)[w + ￿(A + L)] > w + ￿(A + L) ￿ rL ￿ D, or, for A = 0
￿w < D + rL ￿ ￿￿L (18)
which is always the case because of assumptions (A.1) and (A.2) and the fact that r ￿ i. In the
case L > K ￿A, from part (i) we know that the government will only invest K. It is easy to check
that the condition for defaulting is a weaker one which is a fortiori satis￿ed so that, without aid,
both types of government would default on the debt, D, in period t = 1 and thus would not be
able to borrow from private lenders.
18(iii) Assume that a government of type j = h does not default. From part (i), we know that
the utility of the government is increasing in the amount it borrows as long as L ￿ K ￿A. Should
it borrow more, its utility would be equal to:
Uh
ND = w + A + L ￿ K + dh[w + ￿K ￿ rL ￿ D]: (19)
However, from assumption (A.4) we have @UL
@L = 1 ￿ rdh < 0 so that the government will never
demand L > K ￿ A:
Assume now that a government of type j = h defaults. If L ￿ K ￿A, its utility can be written
as:
Uh
D = w + A + L ￿ K + dh(1 ￿ ￿)[w + ￿K]: (20)
which is strictly increasing with new loans, L. However, private lenders would never o⁄er an amount
of loans greater than Lmax = 1
r[￿(w + ￿K) ￿ D], (zero if Lmax < 0). This is the amount of loans
that makes the government indi⁄erent between repaying and defaulting, i.e. w+￿K￿rLmax￿D =
(1 ￿ ￿)(w + ￿K).
It follows that a government of type j = h strictly prefers to demand L = K ￿A so as to max-
imize Uh
ND and to not default. Finally, notice that private lenders would never lend any amount
greater than L = K ￿A because only a government of type j = l would be interested in borrowing
more than L = K ￿ A and defaulting. It follows that the maximum amount of loans that a gov-
ernment of any type may obtain is equal to L = K ￿ A.
Proof of Proposition 1
First of all notice from equation (17) that the maximum amount of new loans that a government
of type j = l repays after debt relief is given by ￿ L ￿
￿w
i . Thus, if K ￿ ￿ L, a government of type
j = l demands and obtains an amount of loans equal to ￿ L, while, from Lemma 1 part (iii), a
government of type j = h demands and obtains an amount of loans equal to K. Because both
governments repay these loans, they are o⁄ered at the risk free rate, i. We rule out this possibility
with assumption (A:6). Consider now the interesting case that K > ￿ L. If the amount of new loans
is L, with ￿ L < L ￿ K, a government of type j = l will always default and renegotiate the debt
in period t = 1 while a government of type j = h will service it as long as ￿(w + ￿L) ￿ rL. Also
notice, from Lemma 1 part (iii), that private lenders never o⁄er an amount of loans greater than
K, as loans in excess of K would be demanded only by governments that want to default in period
t = 1. It follows that a policy of generalized debt relief would lead private lenders to o⁄er new
loans up to a level







Because the capital market is competitive and lenders are risk neutral, the break-even interest rate
on loans e L is implicitly de￿ned as ￿re L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿w = ie L and is thus equal to
e r =
ie L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿w
￿e L
: (22)
Substituting e r for r in equation (21), and solving, the amount of loans, e L, o⁄ered at the interest
rate r = e r is equal to
e L ￿ min
￿





19if e L > ￿ L, and to ￿ L otherwise (see below).
If e L =
￿w[￿+(1￿￿)￿]
i￿￿￿￿ < K, then the interest rate is equal to e rL =
i+(1￿￿)￿￿￿
￿+(1￿￿)￿ .
If instead e L = K <
￿w[￿+(1￿￿)￿]
i￿￿￿￿ , then the maximum amount of loans is K, and the interest rate is
equal to e rk =
iK￿(1￿￿)￿￿w
￿K .
Consider now the decision to borrow by a government of type j = h. As this government
maximizes its second period consumption, ch
1 = w + ￿L ￿ rL, subject to L ￿ e L, and lim
L￿>￿ L
r = i, it








= ￿ ￿ r ￿
@r
@L









There are two cases to consider:
i) If K ￿
￿w
i(1￿￿), we have that
ch
1(e L;e rL) > w + (￿ ￿ i)
￿w
i
() ￿ > ￿1 ￿
i￿ + i(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ + i(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
< 1:
We further have that e L(￿1) =
￿w
i(1￿￿) ￿ K.
Finally, it is easy to check that e L = K and e rL = e rk () b ￿ =
iK￿￿￿w






i if ￿ ￿ ￿1;
￿w[￿+(1￿￿)￿]
i￿￿￿￿ if ￿1 < ￿ ￿ minf1;b ￿g;





i if ￿ ￿ ￿1;
e rL if ￿1 < ￿ ￿ minf1;b ￿g;
e rk if b ￿ < 1 and ￿ > b ￿:
ii) If K <
￿w
i(1￿￿), at ￿ = ￿1, we have that e L = K <
￿w[￿1+(1￿￿1)￿]
i￿￿1￿￿ . It is then easy to check
that
ch
1(K;e rk) > w + (￿ ￿ i)
￿w
i
() ￿ > ￿2 ￿
i(iK ￿ ￿w) + i(1 ￿ ￿)￿w
￿(iK ￿ ￿w) + i(1 ￿ ￿)￿w
< 1:
We thus have that
L =
￿ ￿w
i if ￿ ￿ ￿2
K if ￿ > ￿2
and r =
￿
i if ￿ ￿ ￿2
e rk if ￿ > ￿2
Finally notice that @￿1
@￿ < 0 and @￿2
@￿ < 0:
20Proof of Proposition 2
From equation (21), we know that the maximum loan that a patient government (j = h) demands
and receives from the market when its type is known is equal to b L = minf
￿w
i￿￿￿;Kg.
Then, assume that a government that chooses debt relief receives a loan b L. If this is the case,
the impatient government (j = l) is indi⁄erent between an amount of aid b A = b L, and debt relief.
In fact, if the impatient government choosed debt relief and were believed of type j = h, it would
obtain an amount of loans exactly equal to b L. In either cases it would always consume all the
available resources in period t = 0 and default on the old, or on the new debt, in period t = 1, at
the same cost ￿w.
Consider now a patient government that chooses debt relief and is believed of type j = h. As
before it will invest all resources it receives. Its utility is then equal to
Uh(DR) = w + dh[w + ￿b L ￿ ib L]; (25)
where (DR) stands for debt relief, and (A) for aid.
Then, consider the case in which the patient government chooses aid, b A = b L, and it is believed
of type j = l so that it does not receive any new credit. Two cases must be considered.
i) Suppose that the government repays the old debt D. Its utility would be equal to
Uh
ND(A) = w + dh[w + ￿b L ￿ D]; (26)
and it would be lower than the utility from choosing debt relief as, from assumption (A.5), we have
that D > iK ) D > ib L ) Uh(DR) > Uh
ND(A).
ii) Suppose that the government defaults. Then, its utility would be equal to
Uh
D(A) = w + dh(1 ￿ ￿)(w + ￿b L); (27)
which is lower than the utility from choosing debt relief if b L = K <
￿w
i￿￿￿, that is, if the country
absorptive capacity is limited. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
If donors o⁄er only aid, a patient government (j = h) invests, at most, K. Then, from equations
(26)-(27) and part (iii) of Lemma 1, this government defaults if
D > ￿w + ￿￿K;
which is always the case for K =
￿w
i￿￿￿, because of assumption (A.5), and thus for any K <
￿w
i￿￿￿. Of
course, an impatient government (j = l) also defaults as it never invests. The fact that the patient
government strictly prefers debt relief for A ￿ K follows from
@Uh
D(A)




D(A = K) < Uh(DR). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, notice that the amount of aid, A￿, that donors provide with a policy of only aid depends
on ￿. Since K is the maximum amount of aid that donors would provide, we have that A￿ is
equal to K, for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
i￿￿(1￿￿)
(i￿￿￿￿￿)2K, and it decreases with ￿ for ￿ > ￿ ￿. Hence, from Corollary 1,
21the increase in second-period consumption that can be obtained with an aid-or-debt-relief policy is
always greater than with a policy of only aid, while it is trivially greater than with a policy of only
debt relief.
Two cases should be distinguished: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
i￿￿(1￿￿)
(i￿￿￿￿￿)2K, and ￿ > ￿ ￿.
Assume ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(i) The di⁄erence in the utility from second period consumption between an aid-or-debt-relief
policy and a only-aid policy is equal to zero at ￿ = 0 and increases with ￿. The cost di⁄erential,
between these two policies, CAR ￿ CA, depends on ￿. If ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ iK
￿w+￿￿K, then CAR ￿ CA so
that donors strictly prefer a policy of aid-or-debt-relief to a policy of only aid. If, instead, ￿ > ￿,
the cost di⁄erential, CAR ￿ CA, is equal to zero at ￿ = 0, is positive for ￿ > 0, and increases
with ￿. Since the utility di⁄erential does not depend on ￿, while the cost di⁄erential, CAR ￿ CA,
tends to zero as ￿ ! 0, there exists, for any ￿ > 0, a su¢ ciently low ￿ such that donors prefer
a aid-or-debt-relief policy to a policy of only aid. Furthermore, since the utility di⁄erential from
second-period consumption increases linearly with ￿ while the cost di⁄erential is concave in ￿, the
range of values of ￿ for which donors prefer an aid-or-debt-relief policy increases with ￿.
Consider now the choice between a policy of aid-or-debt-relief and a policy of only debt relief.
The di⁄erence in the utility from second period consumption between these two policies is equal
to zero at ￿ = 0; it reaches a maximum and, then, decreases linearly to zero as ￿ ! 1. The cost
di⁄erential between the two policies, CAR￿CR, is positive at ￿ = 0, it is convex in ￿ and decreases
to zero as ￿ ! 1. Since the cost di⁄erential tends to zero as ￿ ! 0, for any ￿ > 0 there exists a
su¢ ciently low ￿ such that the di⁄erence in the utility from second-period consumption is greater
then the cost di⁄erential and a policy of aid-or-debt-relief is preferred to a policy of only debt
relief. Finally, since the utility di⁄erential from second-period consumption tends linearly to zero
as ￿ ! 1 while the cost di⁄erential tends to zero exponentially, the range of values of ￿ for which
donors prefer an aid-or-debt-relief policy increases with ￿. This proves (i).
(ii) If (1￿￿)iK < ￿w, the utility from second-period consumption of a policy of only debt relief
is always greater than the utility of a policy of only aid. Since the cost of debt relief, CR, is lower
than that of aid, CA, if ￿ ￿
iK￿￿￿w
￿￿￿K , donors prefer a policy of only debt relief to a policy of only
aid. Finally, notice from part (i), that a debt-relief policy is also preferred to an aid-or-debt-relief
policy if ￿ is su¢ ciently low.
If (1 ￿ ￿)iK ￿ ￿w, the di⁄erence in the utility from second period consumption between a
policy of only aid and a policy of debt relief is equal to zero at ￿ = 0, it increases with ￿ reaching a
maximum, and then it decreases linearly becoming negative for ￿ > b ￿. On the other hand, the cost
di⁄erential between the two policies, CA ￿ CR, is positive at ￿ = 0, and decreases exponentially
with ￿ becoming negative for ￿ >
iK￿￿￿w
￿￿￿K > b ￿. Hence, if ￿ is su¢ ciently low a policy of only debt
relief is preferred to a policy of only aid. Finally, since the cost di⁄erential, CA￿CR, increases with
￿, as ￿ ! ￿ ￿ the range of values of ￿ for which donors prefer a policy of only debt relief increases.
Since, from part (i) we know that a debt-relief policy is also preferred to a aid-or-debt-relief policy
if ￿ is su¢ ciently low, this conclude the proof for (ii).
Assume ￿ > ￿ ￿
(iii) First, notice that when ￿ > ￿ ￿ the amount of aid that donors provide with a only-aid policy





Consider, now, the choice between the three policies, and recall that donors should be willing
22to commit a given amount of resources in order to implement a policy of aid-or-debt-relief or a
policy of only debt relief. Thus, the costs of such policies, CAR = ￿
(BAR)2
2 and CR = ￿
(BR)2
2
increase linearly with ￿ (for any given ￿ and ￿ > 0), so that the corresponding utilities, VAR and
VR, become negative for large values of ￿. By contrast, the amount of aid, A￿, provided with a
policy of only aid decreases with ￿ o⁄setting the direct e⁄ect of ￿ on its cost, CR. As aid is set
optimally, the utility of a policy of only aid, at ￿ = ￿ ￿, is equal to VA = ￿
2i￿(1 ￿ ￿)K, while it is
equal to VA =
[￿￿(1￿￿)]2
2￿[i￿￿￿￿￿]2 for ￿ > ￿ ￿. Hence, the utility of a policy of only aid is always positive
with lim￿!1 VA = 0, while lim￿!1 VAR = lim￿!1 VR = ￿1.
It follows that there always exists a su¢ ciently high ￿ such that only-aid is the preferred policy.
Finally, it is easy to check that when lim￿!0 VA = 0, while lim￿!0 VAR < 0, and lim￿!0 VR < 0
23 
Figure 1a:  Private Capital Inflows (Loans and Bonds) 
percent of GDP - unweighted averages  
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Figure 1b:  Total International Claims of BIS-Reporting Banks 
percent of GDP - unweighted averages 
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Figure 2b:  Interest Rates on New Debt - Post-MDRI Countries  
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